Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports Volume 190

Day v. Perkins Properties, LLC	33
Nuisance per se; whether trial court properly concluded as matter of law that defend- ants' operation of landscaping business in residential zone in violation of local zoning regulations constituted nuisance per se; whether violation of local ordi- nance was sufficient in itself to constitute nuisance per se.	
In re Probate Appeal of Knott	56
Probate appeal; whether trial court properly dismissed probate appeal as untimely on ground that substitute plaintiff did not appeal within time limits set by applicable statute (§ 45a-186 [a]); whether time limits for filing probate appeal were tolled by filing of application for waiver of fees pursuant to applicable statute (§ 45a-186c [b]).	50
State v. Irizarry	40
Assault in second degree; breach of peace in second degree; whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction of assault in second degree in violation of statute (§ 53a-60 [a] [1]); claim that state did not establish that defendant caused victim serious physical injury as defined by statute (§ 53a-3 [4]); claim that improper statement by prosecutor during closing argument to jury deprived defendant of constitutional right to fair trial; harmfulness of improper statement by prosecutor during closing argument to jury.	
State v . Riley	1
Murder, whether resentencing court improperly denied motion for recusal where resentencing court was same court that presided over defendant's trial and imposed initial sentence; claim that recusal of resentencing court was required by statute (§ 51-183c), rule of practice (§ 1-22 [a]) Code of Judicial Conduct (rule 2.11 [a] [1]), and due process clauses of fifth and fourteenth amendments to United States constitution; claim that Practice Book § 1-22 provided ground	
for recusal independent of that provided by § 51-183c; claim that rule 2.11 (a) (1) of Code of Judicial Conduct required recusal on ground that resentencing court was biased in favor of justifying defendant's initial sentence; claim that defendant's initial sentence had anchoring effect that prevented resentencing court from approaching resentencing hearing with fully open mind that would allow it to fully consider requirement under Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460)	
that it give mitigating weight to defendant's youth and its hallmark features when considering whether to impose functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole; claim that resentencing court considered seventy year sentence to be inappropriate but nevertheless imposed it because defendant would be eligible for parole pursuant to legislative amendments (P.A. 15-84) to statutes applicable to sentencing of children convicted of certain felonies (§ 54-91g) and parole	
eligibility (§ 54-125a); claim that resentencing court was required under Supreme Court's reversal of defendant's initial sentence and remand order to find that defendant was incorrigible, irreparably corrupt or irretrievably depraved before resentencing him to life without possibility of parole; whether	
discussion by Supreme Court in decision reversing defendant's initial sentence about presumption against life sentence without parole that must be overcome by evidence of unusual circumstances was rendered inapplicable by enactment	
of P.A. 15-84; claim that Miller, Supreme Court's decision reversing defendant's sentence and P.A. 15-84 limited resentencing court's discretion by creating presumption against imposition of life sentence that could be imposed only after finding that juvenile was permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt or irre-	
trievable depraved.	